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Abstract 
Many American multinational corporations (MNCs) have turned into factory-less. They 
outsource the production of their products to foreign companies and derive the largest share 
of their revenue from the intellectual property of core technologies and brand names. When 
factory-less American MNCs sell their products assembled by foreign contract manufacturers 
in overseas markets, they actually “export” the value added attributed to their intellectual 
property embedded in those physical goods. However, conventional trade statistics are 
compiled based on the value of goods crossing national borders, as declared to customs. The 
value added of the intellectual property is generally not recorded as part of US exports. We 
use Apple, a typical factory-less American company that employs exclusively foreign contact 
manufacturers to assembly its products, as a case to illustrate why and how conventional 
trade statistics underestimate actual US exports in the age of global value chains. According 
to our analysis of this case, if the value added of Apple intellectual property sold to foreign 
consumers was counted as part of US exports, total US exports in 2015 would increase by 
3.4%, and its trade deficit would decrease by 7.0%. In terms of bilateral trade, the value 
added under examination here would raise the US exports to China and Japan by 16.6% and 
8.6% respectively, and lower its trade deficit with the two countries by 5.2% and 7.8% 
accordingly.  
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1. Introduction  
The US has run its largest world trade deficit ever in the last several decades. In 2015, it 
recorded a US$745 billion trade deficit in goods. Many economists and American policy 
makers have been concerned with the sustainability of the US trade deficit and its potential 
negative impact on the US economy (Elwell 2007). Most studies on the US trade deficit are 
based on gross domestic product (GDP) accounting and interpret “deficit” as an imbalance 
between saving and investment. Deteriorating domestic savings are widely accepted as the 
main reason for the US trade deficit’s continuing rise (Frankel 2009). Former Fed Chairman 
Bernanke (2005) argued that the persistent and massive US trade deficit is a natural 
consequence of a “savings glut,” i.e. excess savings accumulated by trading partners of the 
US. Valderrama (2007) suggested that relatively high productivity growth in the US 
encouraged greater flows of foreign investment into the US and thus accelerated the trade 
deficit growth.  
 
This paper argues that to a certain extent trade statistics are inconsistent representations of 
trade dominated by global value chains (GVCs), and that they underestimate the actual value 
of US exports and thus overestimate its trade deficit. Conventional trade statistics are 
calculated based on the value of goods crossing national borders. If goods are shipped across 
a country’s border and declared to its customs, the shipment is recorded as an export from 
that country, i.e. the physical crossing of a national border is the criterion for including the 
value of goods in trade statistics. With the unprecedented globalization of the last several 
decades, GVCs have transformed how and where goods are manufactured and traded in the 
world market. Firms from a number of countries are involved in the manufacturing of many 
products traded in the global market. Each firm specializes in one or several production tasks 
and contributes a fraction of the whole value added to a given product. In addition, lead firms 
of GVCs are only in charge of pre-production tasks, such as research and development, as 
well as post-production activities, such as distribution and retails (Gereffi, 2016). Many 
American multinational corporations (MNCs), such as Apple and Nike, have developed 
GVCs for their products and optimally allocate tasks (ranging from product design to 
research and development to manufacturing and marketing) to companies in different 
countries. These lead firms of GVCs concentrate primarily on brand marketing, product 
design and technological innovation, and generally outsourcing manufacturing and 
assembling tasks to foreign companies.  
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This new international division of labor along GVCs has transformed many American MNCs 
into factory-less centers of product design and technology innovation. Factory-less 
manufacturers have no production facilities and outsource the production of their products to 
contract manufacturers, but retain the ownership of their products assembled or manufactured 
by contract manufacturers.  Bayard and Byrne (2015) found that, 21 of companies listed in 
the Standard and Poor’s 500 index, including Advanced Micro Device, Qualcomm Inc., 
Cisco System, Apple and Nike, were exclusively factory-less manufacturing in 2012.  These 
factory-less MNCs no longer manufacture any physical goods, but sell consumers the value 
added of their intellectual property, which is embedded in products assembled or 
manufactured by contract manufacturers. For example, athletic footwear companies such as 
Nike and Reebok and fashion oriented clothing companies such as The Limited and Gap do 
not own any production facilities. They are “merchandisers” who design and market branded 
products in the global market (Gereffi 1994). Apple too has phased out all of its production 
facilities in the US, concentrated on product design, software development and marketing, 
and outsourced the production of its products to foreign contract manufacturers.  
 
When factory-less American MNCs employ contract manufacturers located outside of the US 
to produce or assemble their products, such as Nike shoes, Gap clothes and iPads, and then 
sell those products in international markets, those “American goods” are not counted as part 
of “US export”, because they are not exported from the US but from foreign countries, 
typically China, Indonesia, Viet Nam and other developing countries, where these products 
are manufactured and/or assembled. From the transaction, factory-less American MNCs 
obtain the value added attributed to their brands and technologies, which generally accounts 
for a very large share of the value added of the products. For instance, the gross profit margin 
of the iPhone exceeds 60% (Xing and Detert 2010) and that of Nike products is 46%. Foreign 
consumers purchasing those products pay not only for production costs but also for the value 
added due to the brands and technologies. In other words, factory-less American MNCs 
receive the payment from foreign consumers for the value added of their intellectual property. 
That payment is generally recorded in the current account of the US as part of income earned 
abroad by American companies. However, it does not show up in the statistics of US exports, 
despite the fact that factory-less American MNCs actually “export” that value added to 
foreign consumers.  
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In terms of income generating, the export of the value added of intellectual property has the 
same function as the exports of physical goods, such as grains and cars. Therefore, current 
trade statistics, which only measure the value of goods crossing national borders, are 
inconsistent with the present situation of trade dominated by GVCs. A substantial portion of 
US exports is not included in current trade statistics. Actual exports of American companies 
are underestimated, and at the same time, the US trade deficit is exaggerated. To correctly 
assess the export capacity of the US economy and the sustainability of US trade deficit, it is 
imperative to make necessary adjustments to current trade statistics. 
 
In this paper, we use overseas sales data of Apple, the largest American consumer products 
company, to illustrate how and to what extent conventional trade statistics have 
underestimated the actual value of US exports. Our analysis shows that if the value added of 
Apple intellectual property sold to foreign consumers is counted as a US export, US total 
exports in 2015 would increase by 3.4% and its trade deficit would decrease by 7.0%. In 
terms of bilateral trade, counting the value added of Apple embedded in its products sold to 
foreign consumers could lower the US trade deficit with China by 5.2% and that with Japan 
by 7.8%. These possible changes are due to just one American company, namely, Apple. If 
the value added, earned from international markets by all of the American MNCs which are 
factory-less and utilize foreign contract manufacturers for production, is counted as part of 
US exports, the change would be too big to be ignored.  
 
It is important to emphasize that value added as discussed in this paper differs from license 
fees and royalties, which are generally included in the statistics of service trade. Value added 
here is not the lump sum payment that a domestic company charges a foreign company for 
leasing its intellectual property; rather, it can only be realized after factory-less MNCs sell 
physical products to foreign buyers. It has been a popular research topic to identify foreign 
value added in gross exports and to correct the distortion of current trade statistics on bilateral 
trade balances. Xing and Detert (2010) pointed out that conventional trade statistics tend to 
exaggerate the exports of countries that import many intermediate inputs for the creation of 
exports and inflate significantly the bilateral trade imbalance between China and the US. 
They used 3G iPhone as a case and showed that, the $1.9 billion trade surplus China gained 
in 2009 from the iPhone trade with the US could drop to $73 million, if value added by China 
not gross exports were used in the calculation. They argued that, in the age of GVCs, value 
added, not gross value of exports, should be used in assessing bilateral trade balances. John 
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and Noguera (2012) employed input-output table and bilateral trade data to estimate the value 
added content of bilateral trade.  They showed that the US-China trade imbalance in 2004 
would be 30-40% smaller when measured in value added. The OECD and WTO has 
constructed a database of trade in value added (OECD and WTO 2013) for evaluating value 
added in gross exports of more than 60 countries. Koopman, Wang, and Wei (2014) showed 
theoretically how the value added of gross exports of individual countries could be traced 
with input-output tables.  
 
All those studies argue that gross exports of individual nations contain foreign value added 
and it is imperative to exclude foreign value added in gross exports of a country so as to 
properly evaluate bilateral trade balances. They attempt to decompose gross exports into 
domestic value added and foreign value added. Therefore, the value added as analyzed in the 
existing literature is part of gross exports and recorded in current trade statistics. It represents 
part of manufacturing costs of goods, but does not include the value added of intellectual 
property embedded in the products assembled by foreign contract manufacturers and owned 
by factory-less MNEs. For instance, current trade statistics can only capture the value of parts, 
components and assembly for manufacturing iPhones.  The value added attributed to Apple’s 
brand and technology can only be realized after iPhones are sold to final users. In the process 
of shipping the parts and components as well as assembled iPhones across national borders, 
the value added of Apple’s intellectual property is not declared by any parties, thus not 
recorded by trade statistics of any countries. This paper focuses on the value added of 
intellectual property, which is exported by factory-less American MNCs via the sales of 
products, such as Apple, to foreign consumers, but not included in current trade statistics. 
Taking advantage of GVCs, some American MNCs have turned into factory-less. The GVCs 
considered in this paper is broader than the vertical specialization analyzed by Hummels, Shii 
and Yi (2001). It includes not only production activities, but also pre- and post-production 
activities, such as research and development, product distribution and retails, as defined in 
Gereffi (2016). 
 
2. Apple’s Overseas Sales and Trade Flows 
Since Apple deleted the word “computer” from its original name, “Apple Computer,” it has 
become the largest consumer products company in the world. In 2015, the overseas sales of 
Apple amounted to US$152.0 billion, equivalent to 10.1% of US exports. Since all Apple 
products, iPhones, iPads, iPods and iMacs, are assembled in China, Apple’s overseas sales 
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contribute nothing to US exports figures. On the contrary, trade statistics show that Apple 
overseas sales generate huge exports and trade surpluses for foreign countries, such as China.  
 
Xing and Detert (2010) illustrated how the iPhone sales contribute to the trade flow of non-
US countries and why the volume of US exports is enhanced very little by such sales. We use 
Figure 1 to show the trade flows associated with the sale of a 3G iPhone. When Apple sells a 
US$500 3G iPhone to a foreign consumer, first it sends the sale order to Foxconn, the 
exclusive assembler of iPhones in China. To assemble the iPhone, Foxconn imports 
US$172.46 worth of parts and components, of which US$10.75 comes from the US. When 
the ready-to-use iPhone leaves China, China’s customs records a US$178.96 export for the 
country1. As a result, the sale of the US$500 iPhone gives rise to a total US$351.42 export, 
the sum of the US$172.46 in parts imported and the US$178.96 iPhone exported by China. It 
is important to emphasize that, of the total export, only US$10.75 in parts (about 2% of the 
US$500 sale value) is shipped directly from the US to China and recorded as a US export to 
China. 
 
From the above transaction, Apple earns US$321.04, paid by the foreign consumer for the 
value added of Apple’s brand and technology. However, US$321.04 is recorded neither in 
US export in goods nor in services. It is actually not recognized as either an export or import 
in trade statistics of any country. This constitutes a missing export of Apple intellectual 
property associated with selling one iPhone abroad! To summarize, then, the iPhone trade 
example yields three critical observations: first, the sale of one iPhone abroad creates 
significant trade flows for foreign countries; second, it increases US exports very little; and 
finally, the US$321.04 value added, sold by Apple to foreign consumers contributes nothing 
to US export figures. Figure 1 is created with the 3G iPhone (the first generation iPhone), but 
replications of the analysis for the most recent models of iPhones would yield identical 
conclusions.  
 
The iPhone trade unambiguously demonstrates that conventional trade statistics only capture 
the value of physical goods crossing borders and cannot trace the export of value added 
associated with intellectual property. It fails to reflect the “exports” of factory-less American 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Foxcoon is just an assembler of iPhones. It does not own the intellectual property of iPhones. Hence, it only 
declares the manufacture cost of the iPhone to the customs of PRC. Otherwise, it would have the liability of 
paying the taxes related with the value added of the intellectual property.	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MNCs’ intangible intellectual property embedded in products manufactured and/or 
assembled in foreign countries. As more and more American MNCs turn into factory-less and 
derive most of their earnings from intellectual property, it is biased to use existing trade 
statistics to evaluate US export capacity and trade deficit. Exports are relevant and important 
for national economies because they generate income. In terms of income flows between 
countries, the value added of factory-less American MNC intellectual property sold to foreign 
consumers through products manufactured abroad should be considered as part of US exports, 
and its trade deficit should be adjusted accordingly.  
 
 
Figure 1 Sale of an iPhone abroad and corresponding Trade Flow 
 
 
 
 
 
   
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Xing and Detert (2010) 
 
3. Apple Overseas Sales and Missing US Exports  
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where 𝑉! is the value added of parts manufactured in foreign countries; 𝑉! is the value added 
of parts produced in the US; 𝑉! is assembly cost; 𝑉! is the value added of sale services; and 𝑉!  is the value added by Apple intellectual property, brand name, and technology. As 
illustrated above, when these parts and ready-to-use iPhones are shipped between countries, 𝑉!, 𝑉! and 𝑉! are automatically documented as trade flows. The value added 𝑉! and 𝑉! can 
only be realized after Apple sells its products to foreign buyers. Conventional trade statistics, 
however, cannot capture that transaction. Therefore, 𝑉! is a missing US export.  
 
With regard to Apple overseas sales, we can estimate 𝑉! with the formula below:  
 𝑉! = 𝛽𝑆 − 𝑉!    (2) 
 
where 𝛽 is the average gross margin of Apple’s products and 𝑆 is net overseas sales. Gross 
margin is a company’s total sales revenue minus the costs of goods sold, divided by total 
sales revenue. Apple purchases 𝑉!,𝑉! and 𝑉! from other companies, and they are the costs of 
Apple products. The value of sale services 𝑉! is a necessary component of the total value 
added. Therefore, equation 2 precisely estimates the value added of Apple Intellectual 
property. According to Apple’s Form 10-K of 2015, its average gross margin in 2015, 2014, 
and 2013 were 40.1%, 38.6%, and 37.6% respectively. We use the expenses of selling, 
general and administrative reported in the 10-K form to proxy 𝑉!. These figures are used in 
the following analysis. 
 
The popularity of Apple products has driven the impressive growth of Apple overseas sales. 
According to Apple’s Form 10-K, its net sales in foreign markets totaled US$104.7 billion in 
2013 and surged to US$152.0 billion in 2015, i.e. 45.2% growth over two years. Applying 
Equation (2), we found that, of 2013 foreign sales, US$33.1 billion was attributed to the 
value added of Apple intellectual property. In 2015, the value added of the Apple brand and 
technology accounted for US$51.8 billion of overseas sales, implying a 56.5% increase 
compared with 2013, much higher than the increase in sales. This was due to the increase in 
sales of iPhones, which have the highest gross margin among Apple products (Table 1). 
Despite the high growth of Apple overseas sales, the US export volume benefited very little, 
because all Apple products are assembled in China and shipped from the assembling country 
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to destination markets. Whether Apple repatriates its overseas earning back to the US or not, 
that earning is a payment by foreign consumers and thus part of the leakage of those 
countries’ expenditures. Additionally, that overseas earning supports Apple operations such 
as research and development in the US, and also supports Apple’s stock price, so it 
constitutes a financial asset of Apple shareholders, most of whom are American families and 
pension funds. Hence, Apple’s value added should be considered as an integral part of US 
exports.  
 
Compared with current trade statistics, in 2015 the estimated value added by Apple brand and 
technology in its overseas sales was about 3.4% of US exports and 7.0% of US trade deficit. 
In other words, if the value added by Apple were included, US exports would rise by 3.4% 
and its trade deficit would fall by 7.0% (Table 1). Table 1 also lists the estimates for 2013 
and 2014. It shows that the value added of Apple rose substantially from 2013 to 2015 while 
the reported exports of the US decreased and its trade deficit widened. Adding the value 
added by Apple would change all the numbers considerably. In general, trade statistics are 
compiled using gross values, not value added of goods. In the case of Apple, none of the 
foreign parts and components of its products are imported to the US, and ready-to-use 
products are not assembled in the US either. We should only consider the value added by 
Apple for adjusting the trade figures.  
 
Table 1. US Exports and Apple Overseas Sales (Billions of US Dollars) 
 2015 2014 2013 
US exports 1,503.1 1,621.9 1,578.5 
US trade deficit 745.1 743.5 689.5 
Apple foreign sales 152.0 113.9 104.7 
Apple value added  51.8 36.0 33.1 
Apple value added/US exports (%) 3.4 2.2 2.1 
Apple value added/US trade deficit (%) 7.0 4.9 4.8 
Source: the author’s calculations based on the data of the United States Census Bureau and Apple’s Form 10-K. 
 
In the same fashion, the value added of Apple can greatly modify bilateral trade imbalances 
between the US and its trading partners. China has the largest trade surplus with the US, 
accounting for almost half of US trade deficit. Following the rapid economic growth of recent 
	   10	  
decades, China has emerged as the global center for the assembly of manufacturing products, 
so China’s exports include a large portion of foreign value added, which exaggerates its 
exports as well as trade surplus with the US (Johnson and Noguera, 2012). Moreover, many 
American products sold in China, such as Nike shoes and iPhones, are exclusively assembled  
by local Chinese contract manufacturers and not directly imported from the US. The factory-
less American MNCs, such as Apple and Nike, selling their products manufactured by local 
Chinese contract manufacturers are lead firms of the GVCs and generally pocket the largest 
share of the whole value added of their products sold in China, because of their intellectual 
property ownership.  A critical issue is whether the value added derived from the intellectual 
property of factory-less American MNEs should be considered as a US export to China.  
 
Table 2. US Trade with and Apple Sales in China (Billions of US Dollars) 
 2015 2014 2013 
US exports 115.9 123.7 121.7 
US trade deficit 367.3 344.8 318.7 
Apple sales 56.5 30.6 25.9 
Apple value added  19.2 9.8 8.3 
Apple value added/US exports (%) 16.6 7.9 6.8 
Apple value added/US trade deficit (%) 5.2 2.8 2.6 
Source: the author’s calculations based on the data of the United States Census Bureau and Apple’s Form 10-K. 
 
Chinese consumers’ passion for trendy Apple products has turned China into Apple’s largest 
foreign market. Its sales in China grew drastically and surged from US$25.9 billion in 2013 
to US$56.5 billion in 2015, more than 100% growth over two years. The statement on the 
back of Apple products “Designed by Apple in California Assembled in China” reveals that 
Apple has outsourced the assembling task of its products to firms located in China. Hence, all 
Apple products purchased by Chinese consumers look like “made in China” products, which 
are shipped from the factories in China not from the US. Hence, no matter how many billion 
dollars of products are sold there by Apple, the US customs simply cannot add even one 
dollar to US exports to China. In spite of Apple’s huge success in the Chinese market, the US 
trade deficit with the country rose almost 15%, from US$318.7 billion to US$367.3 billion 
during the period 2013–2015. This is a very strange phenomenon, clearly challenging the 
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credibility and accuracy of current trade statistics in measuring and interpreting trade flows 
and bilateral trade balances..  
 
Applying equation (2), we derived that, from 2013 to 2015, Apple value added sold to the 
consumers of China jumped from US$8.2 billion to US$19.3 billion, approximately a 135% 
increase (Table 2). If the value added obtained by Apple from the sales of iPhones, iPads, and 
iMacs in China were included in the US exports to the country, in 2015 the US exports to 
China would rise by 16.6% and the corresponding deficit would decrease by 5.2%. Hence, 
recognizing the value added of Apple as part of US exports should narrow the trade gap 
between the US and China and mitigate remarkably the bilateral trade imbalance. It is 
noteworthy to mention that the possible change is attributed to just one factory-less American 
company, namely, Apple. Many factory-less American MNCs, such as Nike, ADM and 
CISCO, operate in the same fashion as Apple. If all the value added of their intellectual 
property were recorded as part of the US exports to China, the trade would be more balanced 
than it appears under current trade statistics.  
 
Similarly, adding the value added of Apple derived from the Japanese market could also 
lower the trade imbalance between Japan and the US. In 2015, Japan’s trade surplus with the 
US totaled US$69 billion, second only to that of China. The Japanese case is even more 
intriguing as all Apple products sold in Japan are exported directly from China, not US! None 
of them are regarded as a US export to Japan in current trade statistics. On the other hand, 
when Japanese automakers ship their cars from Japan to the US, all cars are declared to US 
customs and are automatically recorded as part of US imports from Japan, eventually 
becoming part of the US trade deficit. Japanese automobile exports account for most of the 
surplus. This asymmetric reporting unambiguously widens the trade imbalance between 
Japan and the US. Apple captures most of the value added of Apple products sold in Japan 
and it achieves the purpose by selling the products assembled in China. The value added 
gained by Apple should be consider as part of US export to Japan. It is an export of Apple’s 
intellectual property embedded in individual Apple products.  
 
Table 3 compares US exports to Japan and the value added of Apple derived from its sales in 
the Japanese market. US exports to Japan decreased slightly in 2015 to US$62.4 billion from 
US$65.2 billion in 2013, while in the same period Apple sales rose significantly to US$15.7 
billion from US$13.9 billion. Using equation (2), we calculated that the total value added by 
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Apple accounted for US$5.4 billion, US$4.8 billion, and US$4.4 billion of Japanese sales in 
2015, 2014, and 2013 respectively. In 2015, the value added of Apple was equivalent to 8.6% 
of US exports to and 7.8% of its trade deficit with Japan. Hence, including the value added of 
Apple would increase US exports to Japan by 8.6% and accordingly reduce the trade deficit 
by 7.8%.  
 
Table 3. US Trade with and Apple Sales in Japan (Billions of US Dollars) 
 2015 2014 2013 
US exports 62.4 66.9 65.2 
US trade deficit 69.0 67.6 73.3 
Apple sales 15.7 15.3 13.9 
Apple value added  5.4 4.8 4.4 
Apple value added/US exports (%) 8.6 7.3 6.7 
Apple value added/US trade deficit (%) 7.8 7.2 6.0 
Source: United States Census Bureau, Apple’s Form 10-K, and the author’s calculations.  
 
4. Missing Exports and the US Current Account  
The current account of a country can be defined as  
 𝐶𝐴 = 𝑁𝑋 + 𝑁𝑆 + 𝑁𝐼  (3), 
 
where NX is the net exports in goods, NS the net exports in services, and NI net income 
transfers, which comprise the earnings of domestically owned firms operating abroad. The 
current account is more comprehensive than the trade balance in goods, which is often cited 
by economists and policy makers for evaluating the balance of trade. If factory-less American 
MNCs report all their foreign earnings to the US government, the net income transfer NI of 
the US current account should include the value added of their intellectual property 
embedded in products sold to foreign consumers. Therefore, to assess the trade balance of the 
US, the current account should be a better indicator than net exports in goods. There is no 
need to adjust the current account of the US with foreign earnings of factory-less American 
MNCs. On the other hand, if we examine the performance of US exports and attempt to 
investigate to what extent American companies have benefited from free trade agreements 
and unprecedented trade liberalization, conventional export data is not reliable, thus should 
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be adjusted by including the value added of factory-less American MNCs’ intellectual 
property. With regards to bilateral trade relations, the adjustment is needed because there 
exist no bilateral current accounts. To accurately assess trade balances of the US with its 
trading partners, it is imperative to incorporate the value added of factory-less American 
MNCs’ intellectual property sold to foreign consumers. Focusing merely on trade in goods is 
biased and tends to underestimate what the US actually exports, thus exaggerating the 
bilateral trade imbalance.  
 
Figure 2. Balances of Current Account and Trade in Goods for the US (Billion $)  
 
Source:  US Census Bureau. 
 
Figure 2 depicts the balances of US current account and trade in goods from 2000 to 2017. It 
is worthy to emphasize that the trends of the two balances diverged substantially in the last 
decade. Before 2007, the trade balance moved in the same direction as the current account 
balance and the two differed slightly. While the trade deficit expanded from $436 billion to 
$808 billion from 2000 to 2007, the deficit of current account also rose to $711 billion from 
$404 billion. Because of the global financial crisis, the trade deficit fell to $645 billion in 
2009, and then steadily rose to $796 billion in 2017, almost the same level as in 2007.  The 
deficit of current account, however, shrank significantly and fell to $499 billion by 2017, 
about 37% lower than in 2007.  The drastic fall in the current account deficit may suggest 
that, the huge trade deficit was partially offset by the overseas earnings of Apple and other 
factory-less American MNEs.  
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The case of Apple is not unique. Nike, an American company with about one-third share of 
the global sports shoe market, “concentrates on the ‘D’ (develop) and ‘S’ (sell) rather than on 
the ‘M’ (make) and ‘B’ (buy)” (Kaplinsky 2000). It has no manufacturing facilities and 
outsourced the production of all Nike shoes to contract manufacturers in China, Viet Nam 
and other developing countries. The company mainly derives earnings from the intellectual 
property of the “Nike” brand, which is labeled on every pair of shoes sold in the global 
market. According to Nike’s Form 10-K, in 2015 its foreign sales amounted to US$16.4 
billion with 46% gross margin. Using equation 2, we estimated that Nike gained $2.3 billion 
value added from its overseas sales in 2015, roughly equivalent to 0.15% of the US exports 
and 0.30% of the trade deficit. Similar to the case of Apple, the value added by Nike derived 
from overseas markets does not contribute a cent to the US exports figure.  If the value added 
derived by Apple and Nike from overseas markets were added to US exports, in 2015 US 
exports would rise 3.55% and its trade deficit would fall 7.30%.  Incorporating the value 
added of factory-less American MNEs’ intellectual property in trade statistics would make 
the global trade system more balanced than it seems to be according to current trade statistics 
 
As mentioned by Bayard and Byrne (2015), 21 of companies listed in the Standard and 
Poor’s 500 index were exclusively factory-less manufacturing in 2012, including large 
technology companies Advanced Micro Device, Qualcomm Inc. and Cisco System. Unlike 
Apple and Nike, which employ only foreign contract manufacturers, those companies use 
both US and foreign contract manufacturers. Their 10-K forms provide no information where 
their foreign sales are manufactured. To estimate the value added earned by all factory-less 
American MNCs from overseas markets, we need more detailed information. In addition, this 
study only focuses on factory-less American MNCs.  For MNCs with manufacturing facilities 
abroad, such as GM and Ford, it is very difficult to separate their investment income from the 
value added of intellectual property. It would be very controversial to treat their foreign 
earnings as “exports”.  
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
Conventional trade statistics only measure the value of physical goods crossing national 
borders. With the proliferation of GVCs, more and more American MNCs have become 
factory-less, specialized in brand marketing and technological innovations, and outsourced 
product manufacturing and assembling to foreign companies. They sell foreign consumers 
the value added of their intellectual property, which is embedded in products assembled 
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and/or manufactured in foreign countries. Despite factory-less American MNCs making vast 
profits in overseas markets, neither their overseas sales nor value added is counted as US 
exports. Therefore, current trade statistics greatly underestimate US exports and overestimate 
its trade deficit. The failure of trade statistics in capturing exported value added of intellectual 
property has widened the US trade imbalances with China and Japan. Current trade statistics 
are incompatible with trade dominated by GVCs. Reforming trade statistics by incorporating 
the value added of intellectual property attached with goods in the global market is an 
essential step towards a better understanding of how trade benefits all countries involved, in 
particular, countries specializing in brand marketing and technological innovations.  
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